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Synthetic biology, an emerging field of science and technology, intends to make of the 
natural world a substrate for engineering practice. Drawing inspiration from conventional 
engineering disciplines, practitioners of synthetic biology hope to make biological 
systems standardized, calculable, modular, and predictably functional. This essay 
develops a Heideggerian reading of synthetic biology as a useful perspective with which 
to identify and explore key facets of this field, its knowledge, its practices, and its 
products. After overviews of synthetic biology and Heidegger’s account of technology, I 
discuss calculability, utility, function, setting-upon, and ordering, with the aim of 
discussing the manner in which synthetic biology works to render the biological world as 
something to be used, rather than something that is in and of itself. Having developed this 
Heideggerian reading, I proffer a number of corrections to his account that enable a more 
accurate, nuanced understanding of synthetic biology. Specifically, I discuss the notion of 
Ge-stell and submit that multiple systems of ‘enframing’ may help to make Heidegger’s 
argument more robust. I suggest that synthetic biology may work to reveal the natural 
world as a standing-reserve of function. I conclude with thoughts on precision and 
instrumentality. 
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This essay explores synthetic biology—a developing form of biotechnology—through 
Martin Heidegger’s account of modern technology. I employ a Heideggerian reading of 
the field in order to address a key ontological question: how does synthetic biology—as a 
field of human practice—structure our understanding of and relation to the natural 
world? My argument demonstrates that synthetic biology reveals living things as a 
standing reserve of function. My chief aim is ontological, though I submit a number of 
ideas on the place of Heidegger’s framework vis-à-vis modern biological technologies. 
Overall, this piece presents a new case study, extends the application of Heidegger’s 
work, and proposes a number of modifications to his argument about technology. 
 
Heidegger’s ontological explorations of technology are some of his most significant 
contributions to philosophical inquiry, both as a facet of his broader project on Being and 
as a separate philosophical undertaking. Heidegger is often credited as the first 
philosopher to address the ontology question regarding technology, and is likewise 
lauded as a founding figure of the philosophy of technology. Both these accolades are 
well earned—Heidegger’s work on technology is challenging, innovative, and 
illuminative, despite some clear limitations. 
 
Synthetic biology aims to be ‘real’ biological engineering. That is, its practitioners hope 
to make of biological materials a substrate for design and construction in a manner 
analogous to (or ideally, identical with) established engineering disciplines. I contend that 
Heidegger’s arguments on the essence of modern technology, as well as its relationship to 
Being and humanity, are valuable for exploring the character of synthetic biology, its 
knowledge, its practices, and its products.  
 
My argument contributes a philosophical exposition of synthetic biology guided by 
Heidegger’s inquiry. After an overview of synthetic biology and a brief summary of 
Heidegger’s discussion of technology, I explore the field through Heidegger’s key 
concepts and arguments. Focusing on his discussions of calculability, utility, function, 
setting-upon, and ordering, I describe the manner in which synthetic biology works to 
reveal the biological world as something to be used, rather than something that is in and 
of itself. Next, I suggest a number of ways in which his analysis fails to explicate 
synthetic biology fully, and address those difficulties. Most importantly, I explore 
Heidegger’s concept of Ge-stell, and suggest that biotechnology reveals natural things as 
a usable resource of function. Finally, I explore implications of my argument for future 
research. 
 
2. Synthetic biology 
 
Synthetic biology is constituted by an extensive and diverse population of scientific and 
engineering practitioners. ‘The field’ is not a unified discipline with consolidated agendas 
and practices; instead, ‘the field’ is an analyst’s category. Here, I am primarily concerned 
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with two modes of synthetic biological practice: first, that which seeks to construct 
predictably functional organisms in a systematic manner; and second, that which seeks to 
develop biological knowledge through the building of artificial biological constructs. In 
speaking of ‘the field of synthetic biology’ below, I refer to these forms of practice and 
knowledge. Research aimed at constructing proto-cells and attempts to develop minimal 
genomes are not of interest here. 
 
The two forms of synthetic biology with which I am concerned employ similar concepts, 
practices, and epistemic and ontological positions. As I demonstrate, these guiding 
commitments follow an engineering logic. Thus, it is these foundational principles and 
activities which are the subject of my Heideggerian reading of synthetic biology. It is 
worthwhile summarizing these as a first step in bringing Heidegger’s work to bear upon 
synthetic biology. 
 
My argument establishes that synthetic biology premises (and promises) ‘engineerable’ 
nature. That is, its practitioners presume and argue that biological materials, entities, 
systems, and events can be modeled, modified, designed, and constructed in predictable, 
intentional ways. Biology is to serve as a substrate for engineering much as inanimate 
materials provide the base stuff for civil, mechanical, and electrical engineering. The 
practices and principles which underlie much of synthetic biological research are those of 
conventional engineering disciplines: abstraction of complexity (Endy 2005); 
standardization of design components (Arkin 2008); and modularity and decoupling of 
operational elements (Hartwell, et al. 1999; Endy 2005; Sauro 2008). Both in its aim to 
build as well as to know, a great deal of synthetic biology relies upon such principles. 
Biological systems are to be understood and modeled as if composed of functionally 
discrete, identifiable, and calculable modules, and those units are to serve as a basis for 
the construction of functional organisms. The epistemic-ontological position is clear: 
living systems can be analyzed, explained, and subsequently constructed as the physical 
and functional sum of their parts, much as electronic systems are understood and 
constructed. This position is not without controversy (see Kwok 2010), but its acceptance 
within synthetic biology is widespread. Arguably, it is this strict engineering outlook 
which distinguishes synthetic biology from earlier forms of genomics research (see 
Andrianantoandro, et al. 2006). 
 
The broader ambitions of synthetic biologists—for instance, fully predictable 
construction of functional organisms—have yet to be satisfied. Nonetheless, it would be 
inappropriate to dismiss the field’s accomplishments to date. Two examples illustrate 
both the field’s achievements as well as its unsatisfied aims. Jay Keasling’s laboratory at 
the University of California, Berkeley, employed E. coli and yeast to produce chemical 
precursors to the anti-malarial substance artemisinin (Keasling, et al. 2007). Keasling’s 
group modified an existing organism and tasked it with a human-defined function—the 
production of a medical technology. However, the process of genetic transformation 
involved neither ‘rational design’ nor ‘predictable functionality’—two key aims of 
synthetic biology. The project succeeded through a laborious process of trial-and-error 
most often associated with metabolic pathway engineering. A second example is that of 
Michael Elowitz and Stansilas Leibler’s so-called ‘repressilator’ (2000). This construct, 
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composed of three transcriptional repressor systems and a fluorescent reporter, 
functioned to induce oscillatory behavior in E. coli. Each bacterium with this system 
periodically produced green fluorescent protein, effectively glowing in a time-dependent 
manner. Elowitz and Leibler’s aimed to explore natural time-dependency and oscillatory 
behavior by constructing an artificial system with comparable properties. While such 
synthetic oscillators have a number of potential applications, the effort is an exemplar of 
knowing through building. As with the Keasling group’s artemisinin-precursor-producers, 
the ‘repressilator’ demanded a great deal of trial-and-error work. The project did not 
consist of the straightforward process of design and construction towards which many 
synthetic biologists direct their aims. The ‘messy’ nature of these examples does not 
detract from their final achievements; it simply serves to remind observers of the field 
that ‘rational’ design and construction are aims, rather than accomplished realities.  
 
The engineering principles and practices underlying such aims—standardization, 
modularity, rational design, predictable functionality—characterize synthetic biology. 
These principles and practices I explore below in order to subject them and the wider 
field to a Heideggerian reading. Broadly, synthetic biology’s guiding principles suggest a 
crucial fact about this emerging field: synthetic biology aims to be an engineering 
discipline; it hopes to be in the business of making technological things. 
 
3. Heidegger on technology 
 
Given the space constraints and my overall objective here, I cannot provide an exhaustive 
articulation of Heidegger’s thought on technology. Here is simply present an overview. 
After all, this is not a study of Heidegger; rather it is a study with Heidegger of synthetic 
biology. Clearly, any summary is necessarily limited. I direct readers interested in 
dedicated exegeses of Heidegger to examine the list of works cited below. The present 
discussion is one focused on synthetic biology. 
 
3.1 Heidegger on technology 
 
Heidegger aims throughout his ontological investigations of technology to identify and 
characterize the essence of technology. His project rests not with ontic matters—those 
primarily concerned with technological things as contrivances—but rather with 
ontological issues. To wit, he poses the following question: 
 
We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. (QCT: 4)1 
 
Heidegger argues that an ‘instrumental’, or ‘anthropological’, definition of technology 
represents it as simply an employable means towards an end, and offers no possibility of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Primary works by Heidegger are referenced with acronyms as follows: Being and Time 
(BT), Introduction to Metaphysics (IM), Discourse on Thinking (DT), ‘The question 
concerning technology’ (QCT), ‘The age of the world picture’ (AWP), ‘Science and 
reflection’ (SR), ‘The thing’ (TT), ‘Modern science, metaphysics, and mathematics’ 
(MSMM). 
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arriving at an understanding of technology’s essence2. Hood summarizes the distinction 
between instrumental and ontological as follows: 
 
For Heidegger, to conceive something in its ontic dimension means that one 
grasps how it is related to other entities, but to conceive something in its 
ontological dimension is to appreciate how it is related to Being, to appreciate 
exactly how Being makes this entity possible. (Hood 1972: 353, my emphasis) 
 
That is, Heidegger is concerned with technology’s relationship to Being. He wants to 
explore how technology comes to ‘presence’—comes-to-be—in the first place, and why 
it presences in the particular manner in which it does. 
 
This is precisely what ‘essence’ means to Heidegger. ‘Essence’ is not a set of 
characteristics that bind together tokens of a type class; rather, ‘essence’ refers to the 
manner in which things-which-are come to presence for us. Essence is manifested in 
presencing—the way in which everything around us is made intelligible within an 
“ordered and meaningful structure of experience.” (Feenberg 2005: 2). This provides the 
fundamental link to Being, which can be understood as “the ongoing manner in which 
everything that is, presences.” (Lovitt 1982 [1977]: xv) 
 
For Heidegger, the difference between the kind of presencing made possible by ancient 
techné and that of modern technology characterizes two fundamentally distinct ways of 
making artefacts and understanding the world. Feenberg summarizes the point as follows: 
 
Heidegger maintains and emphasizes the contrast between ancient techné and 
modern technology… These are the two chief forms of making and, 
correspondingly, the two chief modes of revealing. (2005: 25) 
 
Heidegger argues that techné is a form of alétheuein—generally translated as ‘revealing’. 
Alétheuein also means ‘truth’ for Heidegger. Thus, techné is involved in a form of human 
artifice that renders things intelligible in such as a way that they are revealed in their true 
selves. A craftsperson making a vase is involved in a process of ushering and nurturing 
the thing into existence. By contrast, the revealing associated with modern technology is 
a challenging-forth. The world is made intelligible following the utilitarian demands of 
the technological system. Heidegger’s notable example of a hydroelectric dam and power 
station is instructive here. The power station affects the manner in which the river in 
intelligible to us: 
 
What the river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence 
of the power station. (QCT: 16) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For Heidegger, only dedicated exploration of technology’s essence can free us from the 
dangerous, obliging relationship that characterizes our interaction with technology. See 
Dreyfus 1997. 
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The essence of technology, at work in the relationship between the power station and its 
environment, is manifest in how the river is rendered intelligible. This form of revealing, 
a challenging-forth of nature that renders it intelligible as raw material for human utility, 
is characteristic of modern technology. Heidegger terms this revealing Ge-stell.  
 
Conventionally, Ge-stell is translated as ‘enframing’, which captures two key facets of 
the concept: first, the notion that Ge-stell, as a revealing, makes the world intelligible 
within a specific set of constraints; second, that this form of revealing reduces the entities 
brought forward to a mere ‘skeleton’ (or ‘frame’) of their actual existence. The 
constraints Heidegger identifies are the “exigencies of planning and control.” (Feenberg 
2005: 25); the reductive presencing of things means that there is no “unmediated access 
to things freed of their usefulness.” (Glazebrook 2001: 377) Ge-stell enframes the world 
as raw material for human utility, as that which can be subjected to the planning, 
controlling, and using activities of humanity. Zimmerman writes that Ge-stell is: 
 
… a one-dimensional way of disclosing entities as raw material, a disclosure 
which provokes humanity to behave in accordance with the technological 
imperative of infinitely expanding production for its own sake. (Zimmerman 
1990: 348) 
 
Put otherwise, Ge-stell reveals the actual as the usable, and things are rendered 
intelligible as stuff to satisfy human needs and amenable to human control. Heidegger 
argues that this form of revealing renders nature as a ‘standing reserve’3 for human utility. 
This standing reserve Heidegger often characterizes as a storehouse of energy: 
 
Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern 
technology and industry. (DT: 50)  
 
To follow the earlier example, the river is intelligible as a source for hydroelectric power. 
It is ‘set upon’ by technology as a repository of usable resources. Its existence as a river 
qua river is suppressed; the river is instead revealed as a substrate for human 
technological ends. 
 
Thus, Heidegger understands the essence of technology to rest with its capacity to affect 
the manner in which things are rendered intelligible to us as usable for our technological 
ends. It is fundamentally a mode of Being which discloses “all beings whatsoever as 
objective, calculable, [and] quantifiable” (Zimmerman 1977: 75). Ge-stell—the essence 
of modern technology—is a form of rendering things around us as intelligible in a 
particular way. I contend that synthetic biology makes the living world intelligible as a 
standing-reserve of function. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The German Bestand is generally translated as ‘standing reserve’. Rouse suggests that 
Bestand describes that which is “standing on call” (1985: 81). Ultimately, the concept 
refers to resources of which humanity may avail itself. 
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In brief, Heidegger argues that the essence of modern technology is a mode of Being, a 
manner in which things are rendered intelligible. This mode of Being is Ge-stell, a 
revealing of things which imperiously forces them to appear to us as calculable, orderable 
material for our use. The world is revealed as a standing reserve for our employment and 
consumption. 
 
3.2 Making use of Heidegger’s argument 
 
My choice of Heidegger’s analysis of modern technology rests on a number of 
considerations. First, there are currently no studies from the philosophy of technology 
that address the ontology question regarding synthetic biology. As such, I find it a useful 
first perspective to employ Heidegger’s work, given his place and prominence within the 
development of philosophical studies of technology. Second, my interest in the manner in 
which synthetic biology works to render living things intelligible in particular ways is 
fundamentally compatible with Heidegger’s project in ontology. Heidegger’s engagement 
with Being and beings rests precisely on how the former constitutes the basis upon which 
the latter are rendered intelligible. Third, the issues that he identifies as central to the 
study of modern technology—such as quantification, utility, ordering, and 
standardization—are all key facets of synthetic biological practice. My engagement with 
this field suggested that his work was best suited to address these topics. 
 
Nonetheless, Heidegger’s work is not without its constraints and complications. Those 
which I view as most problematic to my argument here—his focus on the physical 
sciences and his monolithic conception of Ge-stell—are addressed in section 5. Three 
other issues—the novelty of anthropocentric functionality, Heidegger’s romanticization 
of earlier human practice, and his notion of ‘authentic’ being—are discussed in critical 
asides in section 4.  
 
4. A Heideggerian reading of synthetic biology 
 
My aim is an ontological exposition of synthetic biology that follows Heidegger’s studies 
on modern technology. I intend to demonstrate that synthetic biology renders the living 
world intelligible as a standing-reserve of function. To do so, I address six facets of 
synthetic biological practice: the emphasis placed upon rendering nature as calculable 
and quantifiable; the primacy of function and use in the manipulation of natural systems; 
the making and re-making of ontological distinctions between natural and artifactual 
entities; the harnessing of natural phenomena as a prototypical case of ‘setting-upon’; the 
use of standardization to displace uniqueness and unmanageability; and the relationship 
between physis, poiesis, and modern technology in synthetic biology. In exploring each 
topic through Heidegger’s thought, I address this essay’s central concern: the manner in 
which synthetic biology structures the intelligibility of natural entities and phenomena. 
 
4.1 The primacy of calculability 
 
For Heidegger, Ge-stell discloses all beings as calculable entities—that is, as beings 
susceptible to objective quantification. This manner of revealing entities is characteristic 
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of modern science (AWP, TT, MSMM), and forms the foundation for the making and use 
of technological things (QCT). In being rendered intelligible as a constellation of 
quantifiable objects and occurrences, nature is also disclosed as a resource for human 
disposition. In synthetic biology, principles of calculability are ubiquitous, and provide 
great insight into the constitution of the field, its practices, and its practitioners’ aims. 
 
As I noted above, synthetic biology is comprised by scientists and engineers practiced in 
many different disciplines. These include—but are not limited to—biology, chemistry, 
physics, computer science, and any number of engineering fields. The population of 
engineers in synthetic biology is considerable, and alongside physicists, this constituency 
has contributed to the nascent field a focus on calculation, quantification, and 
engineering-based thinking. The single most distinguishing feature of synthetic biology—
that which might differentiate it from other applications of genetic engineering 
techniques—is the discursive and practical emphasis upon engineering principles and 
concepts (see Heinemann & Panke 2006). Undoubtedly, this phenomenon is a 
consequence of the field’s composition. The migration of an engineering optic into the 
field of biological science and technology underlies the primacy of calculability in 
synthetic biology. It also lends credence to Heidegger’s argument that Ge-stell makes 
beings intelligible as quantifiable and exploitable entities. 
 
Quantification is a core concept in engineering practice, and is of vital interest to 
synthetic biological practitioners. While measurement and quantification of biological 
phenomena and occurrences remain monumental problems for the field, there exist early 
attempts to develop measurement units and guidelines (e.g. Canton, Labno, & Endy 
2008). In order to quantify the transcriptional process, units such as PoPS and RiPS have 
been proposed. Respectively, these are acronyms for Polymerase Per Second and 
Ribosomes Per Second. These proposed units have been discussed in a variety of ways by 
practitioners (e.g. Chopra & Kamma 2006; Arkin 2008; Purnick & Weiss 2009), but their 
use is broadly symbolic. Nonetheless, the key philosophical point concerns the zeal for 
calculability. PoPS and RiPS are biological analogues to electrical current in an 
electronic system, and while imperfect, they satisfy a scientific and technological drive 
for quantification and measurement. 
 
A related, supremely important component of Heidegger’s argument concerns the 
ontological reality of that which is not quantifiable. Heidegger argues that science and 
technology allow only for that which is calculable and orderable. Beings presence as 
calculable entities; those which cannot be rendered in calculable or orderable forms are 
dismissed or omitted. This has bearing for synthetic biology in relation to physicalism 
and vitalism. The former position holds that biological processes and phenomena are 
ultimately wholly explainable in terms of quantitative physical theory; the latter attributes 
to living organisms qualities not susceptible to physical explanation. Vitalism in its 
strongest iteration advocates for the existence of a vis vitalis; in more moderate forms, it 
simply rejects the premise that physical laws are capable of accounting for all biological 
phenomena. Many synthetic biologists reject both vitalist and anti-reductionist arguments 
on the same ground (e.g. Nature Editorial Board 2007; Yeh & Lim 2007). Namely, that 
such stances amount to little more than mysticism, and are wholly unscientific. The 
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proper scientific perspective is based in quantification. Following from their commitment 
to engineering-based thinking and a drive towards calculability, practitioners admit no 
explanations that provide for biological phenomena irreducible to physical explanation. 
Heidegger writes: 
 
That which is, is only that which, when correctly thought, stands up to correct 
thinking. (IM: 207) 
 
Put otherwise, the theoretical and experimental basis of a particular science will 
determine what is an appropriate view of the world, as well as how beings are rendered 
intelligible. Synthetic biology can structure what is understood to be real—that which ‘is’. 
As Rouse writes: 
 
Only what can show up within the [scientific] procedures by which we achieve a 
‘proper perspective’ on the world is real. (1985: 80) 
 
For synthetic biology, the proper perspective—theoretical and experimental—is one that 
depends upon physical quantification. Physicalism does not simply refuse to admit 
particular arguments: it denies to non-calculable entities and phenomena their existence. 
That which is not calculable is not accepted; that which is not quantifiable is not real. The 
result is a dismissal of countless entities and phenomena that cannot be quantified with 
existing techniques, but that are important aspects of living things nonetheless.  
 
In summary: the essence of modern technology is in part defined by a drive to 
calculability and quantification. Such a drive affects how natural entities and phenomena 
are rendered intelligible. Those facets of them that can be quantified are intelligible; those 
that cannot are omitted. 
 
4.2 Function, use, and value 
 
Calculability and usability are complimentary concepts in Heidegger’s thought. Thus, for 
something to ‘presence’ as a calculable entity is for that same entity to become involved 
in a system of order and use. Heidegger argues that technology reveals the natural as 
exploitable raw material for human manipulation. Purpose is attributed where none 
existed previously, as the “meaning and purpose of things is something we create, not 
something we discover.” (Feenberg 2005: 12) Technology reveals nature as something to 
be used. 
 
Function and purposefulness are supremely important concepts and aims within synthetic 
biology. This is particularly the case for synthetic biologists working to develop 
predictably functional organisms. Currently, a number of projects are underway to 
develop organisms capable of human-defined functions. These include producing 
biodiesel (Savage, et al. 2008), fixing nitrogen from the atmosphere, targeting and 
destroying cancerous cells (Anderson, et al. 2005), and storing information (Ajo-Franklin, 
et al. 2007). These projects are not proof-of-principle exercises. Fundamentally, these are 
engineering endeavors aimed at creating technologically-functional biological systems. 
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Practitioners often describe their intention as that of creating organisms ‘for useful ends’. 
Clearly, synthetic biologists concerned with designing and building functional organisms 
are making of natural entities purposeful objects. 
 
A first critical aside is warranted at this point. Heidegger associates anthropocentric 
functionality and value with Ge-stell. Natural things are rendered intelligible as resources 
for our use. However, natural entities during the Greek and medieval periods may have 
just as easily been framed in such terms. After all, milk cows, race horses, and pets all 
serve anthropocentric ends—consumption, entertainment, and companionship—and all 
predate the rise of Heidegger’s modern technology. Functionality is not novel. However, 
I believe that in the case of synthetic biology, Heidegger’s argument stands. Unlike 
previous human practices with living systems, this field attempts to incorporate the 
predictability of engineering design and fabrication. As I will discuss further below, this 
is clearly a modern phenomenon, and distinguishes between the kind of broad 
functionality of milk cows and race horses, and the predictable engineered functionality 
of modified E. coli. 
 
The making of functional organisms is consistent with Heidegger’s account of 
technology. Moreover, the desire to construct predictably functional organisms brings to 
mind his argument that calculability and usability are unavoidably linked to humanity’s 
will to mastery. Predictability in synthetic biology implies control. To render biological 
systems predictable in the same manner as that of conventional products of engineering—
for instance, electronic circuits or automobiles—is to engage in the imposition of 
certainty. Perhaps more lucidly: in order for biological systems to be controllable, they 
must be predictable; predictability demands certainty. The demand for certainty is central 
to engineering practice (see Vincenti 1990). However, unpredictability is often described 
as one of the defining empirical characteristics of living entities. Synthetic biology must 
temper organisms’ propensity towards unpredictability in order to satisfy its aim of 
predictable functionality. 
 
The drive for technological reliability—in the form of predictable functionality—is an 
unequivocal display of humanity’s will to mastery. Unpredictability is a distinguishing 
characteristic of living entities. Synthetic biologists often argue that this is an illusory 
problem: we simply don’t know enough yet. Nonetheless, this supposition is rarely 
challenged; even the possibility of inherent unpredictability is disregarded as unscientific4. 
Within the confines of synthetic biology, unpredictability is a problem to overcome. 
Heidegger writes: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Quantum mechanics’ focus on probability, rather than complete determinacy, is often 
employed to challenge this facet of Heidegger’s argument. Nonetheless, quantum 
mechanics also implies that only what has been measured can be known, thus lending 
credence to Heidegger’s argument that human metrics are the basis for what is real (See 
Glazebrook 2000, Ch. 5). Ultimately, my focus is synthetic biology, not quantum physics, 
so the point is only of tangential interest.  
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 The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to 
 slip from human control. (QCT: 5) 
 
This may be read as indicating that as a technology’s recalcitrance grows, so too does the 
human will to master it. Biology is difficult to control; biological technologies 
correspondingly resist the type of predictive functionality expected of modern 
technologies and celebrated as a goal for synthetic biology. As a result, the will to 
mastery is heightened within this field. Unpredictability—the empirically real—must 
give way to predictability—the desired useful. In itself, this transition is indicative of 
technology’s emphasis upon the exploitable over the actual, a topic I discussed above. 
Here, the transition is less important than the methods by which it is being undertaken.  
 
In summary: Technology renders beings as useful. To be technologically useful, such 
beings must display predictability. Making natural entities predictable is considerably 
difficult. Heidegger argues that in such cases, the will to control is stoked. Thus natural 




For Heidegger, the revealing enabled by modern technology is a bringing-forth that sets-
upon. Put otherwise, modern technology is responsible for rendering things intelligible in 
such a manner that nature is subordinated to human endeavors and forced to yield itself 
as resource. Modern technology does not make use of nature’s products in a manner that 
respects natural limitations; it does not harvest products that bring themselves about. 
Rather, it forcefully draws these products from nature, compelling natural entities to 
provide beyond their ordinary capacities. Nature is set-upon insofar as the dictates of 
human practice determine the productive capacity of natural entities. Heidegger also 
refers to this setting-upon as a challenging. 
 
Heidegger’s key example in illustrating this challenging is that of cultivation and 
agriculture. Whereas ancient forms of agriculture respected the limitations of plants, 
modern technological agriculture orders, forces, and exhausts nature. He writes: 
 
The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently 
than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work 
of the peasant […] places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches 
over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under 
the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it 
in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. 
(QCT: 14-15, emphasis original) 
 
The ‘mechanized food industry’ forcefully compels nature to yield ever-increasing 
quantities of product, with limited regard for the natural limitations of plants. The history 
of cultivation is a trajectory increasingly away from overseeing and caring towards 
greater ordering and coercing. 
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A brief detour is warranted here. Heidegger’s arguments about setting-upon, and 
particularly his claims about agriculture, may appear to be unjustified romanticizing of 
the past. This critique is valid, but I believe that his point still holds. Industrial agriculture 
is different from smaller-scale subsistence farming. When the social, political, and 
economic contexts of such practice change—as they have over the thousands of years of 
human cultivation—so too does our relationship to the objects of those practices. That’s 
the key point. Industrialization changes our understanding of cultivated plants. 
Engineering practices—born in the late 19th century—may similarly change our 
understanding of living things through synthetic biology. 
 
Many projects in synthetic biology fall under the category of chemical production. 
Biological organisms are particularly adept at making chemicals, and this capability has 
been and is being harnessed in the making of valuable substances. The Keasling group’s 
work resulted in organisms capable of producing chemical precursors to artemisinin—a 
valued anti-malarial drug. Ongoing work in the same laboratory aims to do the same for 
biodiesel. Living entities’ capacity to construct chemicals, as well as the relatively low 
cost of employing self-reproducing colonies of microscopic organisms instead of 
laborious chemical synthesis, are two factors responsible for this focus in synthetic 
biology. 
 
Creating microbial chemical-producers broadly demands two steps. First, organisms must 
be modified to produce the required chemical. This often involves so-called metabolic 
pathway engineering, and is generally the more difficult of the two steps. The Keasling 
lab’s work with anti-malarial drugs was onerous, time-consuming, and expensive. The 
second task in this type of synthetic biology is the ‘fine-tuning’ of a modified organism to 
increase yield and maximize efficiency. Put otherwise, an organism capable of producing 
the required chemical must also be optimized to produce the highest possible output with 
the lowest possible consumption of feedstock and energy. This second component 
concerns both the viability of the entity as well as the cost-effectiveness of the system. 
 
This form of synthetic biology ‘sets-upon’ nature in two ways. First, organisms are 
rendered intelligible as nothing more than microbial chemical factories. They are 
physically and functionally tasked with the making of chemicals generally foreign to the 
natural variants of the organism. Such chemicals may even be toxic to ‘wild-type’ strains. 
The products harvested are not those that come into being as a result of natural and 
unforced processes; rather, they are the result of intentional changes to the organism. 
Second, in order to maximize yield, natural regulatory mechanisms are generally disabled 
or transformed. Like the mechanization of cultivation, here the harvesting is not 
respectful of natural limitations. It is a coercive challenging-forth. Organisms do not 
naturally bring forth their products; they are modified following the dictates of human 
necessity and in accordance with engineering standards and practices5.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Put otherwise, living things are transformed into things of human artifice with human-
specified functions. C.f. Author, forthcoming, for an extended discussion of this 
particular issue. 
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In summary: Technological functionality and control are not deterred by natural 
limitations. Within synthetic biology, living entities are set-upon, challenged, and 
brought-forth as components of a productive technological system. They are rendered 
intelligible as things to be exhausted of their products. 
 
4.4 Orders of nature and artifice 
 
Every issue discussed above relates to ordering. Calculability is a form of setting-into-
order; functionality requires an order of practice within a technological system; setting-
upon is not simply a coercive drawing-forth of resources—it is also a forceful setting-
into-order. Throughout Heidegger’s writings on technology, ordering plays a central role 
in defining not simply the essence of modern technology, but also our relationship to 
technological things themselves. Heidegger’s discussions on equipment (BT), things (TT), 
science (AWP), mathematics (MSMM), and technology (QCT) all depend on an 
understanding of revealing as ordering.  
 
As noted above, the revealing associated with modern technology, Ge-stell, is a 
superficial presencing of things. Nature is revealed as a standing-reserve for human 
disposition. Technological systems challenge nature forth as nothing more than raw 
material. The scientific optic—a product of the essence of technology—similarly 
represents things in a manner distinct from their authentic being, as entities orderable 
under a scientific rubric. These two facets of revealing as ordering—technological and 
scientific—result from the same essence of technology, but are manifested differently. 
 
In discussing the scientific optic, Heidegger considers the case of a jug filled with wine 
(TT). Seen through the perspective of science, the wine filling the jug is perceived 
through physical concepts of states of matter. Heidegger writes: 
 
In the scientific view, the wine became a liquid, and liquidity in turn became one 
of the states of aggregation of matter, possible everywhere. We failed to give 
thought to what the jug holds… (TT: 169) 
 
Stated simply, that which makes wine distinct qua wine is suppressed. Wine as a unique 
thing is concealed by universal and universalizing laws of physical science, or rather, its 
authentic being is never given the opportunity to come forth into presencing. Glazebrook 
offers a similar example in noting that the physics of falling objects does not distinguish 
between a falling apple and a falling bomb (2000). 
 
Synthetic biology presents a similar case. That form of synthetic biology concerned with 
developing biological knowledge attempts to develop models and descriptions of intra-
cellular activity, from the workings of individual genes to the interaction of proteins to 
the movement and growth of the entire organism. The current state of knowledge and the 
considerable complexity of natural entities and processes force such scientific work to 
rely on a great deal of simplification. Complex behaviors are ‘black-boxed’; simplifying 
assumptions are put into place. Such practices are employed in the hope of developing 
successful models, simulations, and descriptions. Read through Heidegger’s argument, 
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such practices obscure and obstruct the self-presencing of microscopic organisms much 
as states of matter obfuscate wine qua wine. Organisms are reduced to chemical 
interactions; complex living entities become simplified vessels of molecular activity. The 
living thing as a living thing is replaced by a diagrammatic understanding of events and 
scientific objects.  
 
Heidegger’s notion of revealing as an ordering also concerns the bringing-forth of nature 
as a standing-reserve. Ge-stell is fundamentally a constraining and imperious revealing 
that brings nature forth as resource for human consumption. The river becomes a source 
of hydroelectric power; the soil of the field a resource for the mechanized food industry. 
Similarly, synthetic biology brings forth natural organisms as resources for various 
technological systems—for instance, as sources of chemical compounds for the 
biomedical industry. Moreover, organisms themselves are revealed as technological 
objects; that is, not as standing-reserve, but as instrumenta. 
 
In summary: The essence of modern technology involves setting beings into particular 
orders. This kind of structuring underlies the manner in which things are rendered 
intelligible. For synthetic biology, such ordering follows the scientific principles that 
characterize physicalist studies of living things, as well as the technological expectations 




Heidegger argues that modern technology reveals nature as an orderable, manageable, 
disposable substrate for human enterprise. Above I addressed calculability, control, 
setting-upon, and ordering as facets of human technological practice in synthetic biology. 
Yet another aspect of Heidegger’s argument is that of order as management. In the 
challenging-forth that reveals nature as standing-reserve, beings are incorporated into a 
system of technological management. 
 
Consider Heidegger’s example of a tract of land challenged-forth as a deposit of valuable 
minerals. The earth is revealed as a deposit of employable substances such as coal and 
ore. The coal drawn from such a tract is produced, shipped, stored, and eventually used to 
generate electrical power—it is “on call” within a technological system (QCT: 15). That 
system encompasses an industry of monumental scope, comprised by mining 
technologies, shipping and storing facilities, electrical generating stations, distribution 
networks for electrical current, the vast assortment of tools and contrivances that make 
use of that electricity, and the instruments needed to register and bill for power 
consumption. It is a system designed to regulate, manage, and use the resources drawn 
from the tract of land in a determinate manner. The hydroelectric station is fundamentally 
part of the same system, with modifications allowed for a different form of generating 
power. Nonetheless, those differences are in a great many ways irrelevant. The output of 
both power stations is measured in the same manner; the demands placed upon the 
distribution network are the same; the use and billing of that electricity is identical. The 
fundamental differences between land and river are suppressed—both are standing 
reserves of energy. 
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Lovitt and Lovitt argue that Heidegger stresses the equalization of natural entities within 
technological systems. Idiosyncrasy is difficult to manage; that which conforms to set 
standards is predictable. As such, technology “suppresses uniqueness and promotes 
indistinguishablity”  (Lovitt and Lovitt 1995: 242). Heidegger suggests that the standing-
reserve is ‘objectless’ (QCT: 19). That is, when things are revealed simply as resources 
for human use, as standing-reserve, they are deprived of their unique existence as distinct 
beings (Glazebrook 2000). Ge-stell strips objects of their ‘objectness’ and reveals them as 
simply that-which-can-be-used. Once again, the actual becomes the usable. Several of 
synthetic biology’s key aims precisely focus on achieving this anonymous uniformity.  
 
Much of synthetic biology actively works to standardize biological phenomena. 
Following conventional engineering practices regarding standard, interchangeable 
components and modular construction, synthetic biologists have attempted to develop 
biological analogues to standardized nuts and bolts. So-called standard biological ‘parts’ 
are discrete segments of DNA intended to serve specific purposes. ‘Parts’ are in theory 
physically and functionally discrete modules for genetic construction. They may serve to 
initiate genetic transcription (promoters), end such transcription (terminators), or act as 
signaling devices for scientific experimentation (reporters). Of most fame are ‘BioBricks’, 
developed and stored at MIT’s Registry of Standard Biological Parts. These display 
limited modularity and functional isolation, although as a whole ‘BioBricks’ display 
much of the same context-dependence characteristic of biological processes. The newly-
established BIOFAB aims to categorize, refine, and standardize many of these existing 
‘parts’, as well as develop new technologies for making biology modular (Sanders 2010). 
This drive for uniformity is designed to improve the reliability and predictability of 
genetic constructs, as well as simplify the design process. Making biology manageable 
requires tempering nature’s characteristic idiosyncrasy. 
 
In summary: Technology suppresses the individuality of beings. Instead, it subordinates 
entities to the use they serve. Within synthetic biology, this entails that natural entities are 
deprived of their inherent idiosyncrasy in order to make them standardized and 
manageable beings. They are rendered intelligible as interchangeable and uniform. 
 
4.6 Physis, poiesis and modern technology 
 
Much of Heidegger’s work on technology directly addresses the relationships between 
physis, poiesis, and modern technology. This topic is vitally important to studies of 
studies of synthetic biology. Zimmerman summarizes Heidegger’s use of physis and 
poiesis as follows: 
 
Physis names the self-generating bringing-forth of living things, but also names 
the presencing by virtue of which such things comes into appearance within a 
world… The name for physis in human existence is poiesis: the disclosiveness (art 
in its broadest sense) which makes bringing-forth (producing of all kinds) 
possible.” (Zimmerman 1990: 234) 
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Physis is self-revealing—the uncompelled bringing-forth of things. The blooming of a 
rose is an example of physis, which is ultimately the “bursting forth of a thing out of 
itself” (Lovitt 1973: 47). Poiesis is the intentional human revealing of things—as 
Zimmerman notes, ‘art’ in the broadly-encompassing sense of human production. 
Heidegger emphasizes that authentic poiesis is humble and assistive6. The sculptor 
provides the opportunity and carries out the nurturing needed for the sculpture to reveal 
itself from the block of marble. Disingenuous poiesis is invasive and forceful revealing; 
its epitome is Ge-stell. Ge-stell compels entities into revealing themselves as manageable 
resource for human utility. Synthetic biology presents a compelling tension. It employs 
living entities—those which are self-revealing through physis—to accomplish 
technological ends—those which involve the invasive challenging-forth of modern 
technology. 
 
Heidegger views physis as the most authentic form of revealing. The self-exhibiting of 
say, a rose in bloom is the most authentic manifestation of Being. In physis, things are 
most accessible as themselves. That which is real “is what presences as self-exhibiting” 
(SR: 167). The undisturbed existence and multiplication of microscopic living entities is 
precisely this form of self-revealing. The imperious challenging-forth of technology 
stands oppossed to this uncompelled presencing. Again, the river is not permitted to 
presence as itself, but rather is rendered intelligible as a storehouse of employable energy; 
it is challenged-forth from what is real to what is usable. Comparably, the objects of 
synthetic biology—those studied, conceptualized, and fabricated—are compelled into a 
modern technological revealing, rather than allowed to self-presence in physis. Despite 
the myriad difference between living things and technological objects, nature is subjected 
to an engineering optic. Living things are rendered intelligible as what we want them to 
be, rather than existing as what they are. The intelligibility of things contingently rests 
upon the mode of revealing of different practices. The sculpture’s poiesis reveals 
differently than does the Ge-stell of modern technology. 
 
Another critical deviation is necessary here. Heidegger’s discussion of physis, poiesis, 
and modern technology presents the notion of authenticity of being. Authenticity is a 
particularly problematic concept, but it is also unnecessary to making use of Heidegger’s 
work. The real issue is how any given human practice—here, synthetic biology—renders 
things intelligible. Heidegger argues that modern technology imposes anthropocentric 
utility upon the world to the exclusion of all else. My argument is similar. Synthetic 
biology renders living things as objects to be used. Authenticity is not needed as a 
concept. What matters is that synthetic biology imposes a particular, contingent way of 
structuring our understanding of and relation to living things.  
 
In summary: Heidegger argues that modern technology suppresses the natural coming-
into-being of things, instead imposing a utilitarian being on the world. In subjecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 While it may be possible to argue that poiesis is synonymous with craft practice, I do 
not believe that this craft practice is of the kind found in scientific research. Moreover, 
synthetic biologists explicitly advocate a move away from craft to ‘real’ engineering.  
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natural things to an engineering optic, synthetic biology renders them intelligible as 
things humans can use. Ge-stell frames such natural things as resource. 
 
4.7 A Heideggerian reading of synthetic biology 
 
This essay addresses the manner in which synthetic biology structures the intelligibility 
of natural entities and phenomena. I have argued the following: synthetic biology renders 
things as quantifiable and dismisses that which is not calculable; it enframes things 
within expectations of utility; it makes entities intelligible as limitless resources; it orders 
things following anthropocentric aims and values; it suppresses natural idiosyncrasy and 
imposes artificial uniformity; and it mobilizes an engineering optic to understand its 
products. In brief, synthetic biology renders living systems intelligible as things to use, 
rather than simply things in and of themselves. 
 
5. Revisiting Heidegger’s account 
 
A Heideggerian reading of synthetic biology offers much but also makes evident a 
number of his argument’s limitations. Resolving these difficulties may improve my 
exposition of synthetic biology, as well as prove helpful in evaluating the applicability of 
Heidegger’s work within contemporary discussions of technology. 
 
5.1 Physics, biology, etc. 
 
Heidegger’s arguments about calculability, utility, and the standing reserve, as well as his 
account of technology more broadly, are based upon the claim that physics underlies the 
technological enterprise. He writes: 
 
… [modern technological revealing] concerns nature, above all, as the chief 
storehouse of the standing energy reserve. Accordingly, man’s ordering attitude 
and behavior display themselves first in the rise of modern physics as an exact 
science. (QCT: 21)  
 
For Heidegger, modern physics is “the herald of Enframing” (QCT: 22), and without the 
exacting quantification employed by the physical sciences, Ge-stell is not possible. 
 
A narrow focus on physical science is defensible if technology is understood only in the 
context of such disciplines as chemical, mechanical, or electrical engineering. Synthetic 
biology aims to be and might one day become the biological analogue of these 
engineering fields. As such, a Heideggerian reading of synthetic biology demands a 
consideration of the biological sciences. 
 
As I establish above, synthetic biology draws practitioners from a broad constellation of 
sciences and engineering disciplines. Predictably, a large number of these individuals 
have backgrounds in the biological sciences or biology-focused research. Biology is a 
fundamentally different science than physics (see e.g. Mayr 2004), and many of 
Heidegger’s claims about the latter—such as the drive towards calculability—are not 
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applicable to the former. Nonetheless, in studying biological engineering, the distinct 
character of biological science is less relevant than it might appear to be. 
 
Above, I describe the manner in which principles and practices from conventional 
engineering disciplines are mobilized within synthetic biology. Concepts such as 
standardization, modularity, and calculability are clearly important to this developing 
field. While the biological sciences matter greatly, biological knowledge is read through 
the core principles of engineering disciplines whose basis is found in the physical 
sciences. Unifying much of synthetic biology is a commitment to the use of an 
engineering optic. This optic is the most suitable focus for a Heideggerian analysis. The 
issues above concerning calculability, functionality, and utility stem from the precepts of 
such an engineering-based understanding of the natural world. 
 
Heidegger’s thought fails to acknowledge and engage with the multiplicity of sciences 
and engineering practices represented in synthetic biology—as well as countless other 
contemporary technical and scientific fields.  Ignoring vital differences between say, civil 
and biological engineering obscures the character of each field, its chosen materials, and 




For Heidegger, Being is “that which makes the beings of the world accessible and 
intelligible to us” (Zimmerman 1977: 75). It makes possible our understanding and 
experience of that-which-is-real—it is “the reality of the real” (Ibid.: 76). Importantly, 
Being is not historically-invariable. The manner in which ancient techné revealed the 
world differs substantially from the Ge-stell of modern technologies. Heidegger attributes 
this difference to a change in humanity’s relationship to Being. 
 
Ge-stell is a challenging-forth that reveals the natural world as a standing reserve for 
human utility. This form of revealing must be understood in the context of Heidegger’s 
focus upon the physical sciences. Revealing the natural world as a quantifiable, 
manageable, and useful reserve depends upon the precepts and practices of modern 
physics, which for Heidegger is intimately bound up in the essence of modern technology. 
For the present argument, Heidegger’s insistence on a single, defining form of revealing 
is limiting. Might we not insist on the possibility of various forms of enframing? I believe 
this question can be addressed in two ways. 
 
The first approach employs the context dependence and historical contingency of Being. 
In ‘The question concerning technology’, Heidegger proffers an analysis of modern 
technology based upon the character of modern physical science. A contemporary use of 
Heidegger’s work might instead focus on the development and use of modern biological 
science and biological technologies. After all, Heidegger’s arguments on technology were 
formed prior to the postulation of the double-helix structure of DNA, and a fortiori the 
growth of molecular biology. New science and new technologies might betoken a new 
relationship to Being. 
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Perhaps synthetic biology presents humanity with a novel ontological condition, one 
enabled in virtue of this particular technological practice. While this approach may offer 
some insight into the ontological question of synthetic biology, I believe it presents a 
number of unacceptable difficulties. Most importantly, such an argument is 
unsatisfactorily simplistic. Equating a new science with a new mode of Being postulates a 
straightforward, linear relationship between science and our understanding of the world. 
However, Being is broader than just one type of scientific practice. Moreover, giving to 
synthetic biology the power of radically transforming our relationship to Being grants too 
much importance to a collection of practitioners lacking the kind of coherence found in 
other scientific and technical disciplines. As such, not only does this answer misrepresent 
synthetic biology, it affords the field with unwarranted influence over ontological matters. 
 
A second approach to resolving this issue focuses not on the changing face of Being, but 
rather on Heidegger’s concept of Ge-stell. Contrary to the monolithic Ge-stell Heidegger 
proposes, I suggest one that encompasses various modes of enframing. Glazebrook 
posited a similar approach vis-à-vis science and technology: 
 
The Ge-stell of technology is standing-reserve—beings appear as resource. The 
Ge-stell of science is objectivity—beings appear as object. (2000: 241) 
 
Of course, utility and objectivity are interrelated. For instance, calculability is preeminent 
in both. Nonetheless, modern science and modern technology reveal the world in ways 
unique to each practice. Glazebrook’s keen observation suggests a useful elaboration of 
the concept of Ge-stell. Technological and scientific fields differing in their composition 
may also differ in their revealing of the natural world. 
 
5.3 A standing reserve of function 
 
Heidegger characterizes Ge-stell as a challenging-forth that reveals the natural world as a 
standing reserve, to be employed and managed by the human technological enterprise. He 
characterizes this standing reserve with various examples, including those of a 
hydroelectric power station, a mechanized farm, and an airplane sitting on the tarmac. 
These examples share a common feature: modern technology reveals each as use-
potential. I posit that while Ge-stell is a revealing that renders natural things as objects for 
human utility, the specific manner of each rendering depends upon the character of the 
technology in question. Ge-stell is not monolithic. It is a complex arrangement of modes 
of revealing. Each mode is a contingent phenomenon, characterized by the particularities 
of any given scientific or technological practice. 
 
Synthetic biology does not reveal the world as a standing energy reserve in the manner 
that Heidegger often attributes to modern technology. Although there exist multiple 
projects aiming to develop fuel-producing bacteria (Savage, et al. 2008), characterizing 
these as attempts to make of the natural world a source of energy does little for our 
understanding of synthetic biology. Such a representation would be inapplicable to the 
majority of projects currently underway in the field, such as those pursuing ‘smart’ 
therapeutic organisms (e.g. Anderson, et al. 2005) or biological memory (e.g. Burrill & 
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Silver 2010). The unifying characteristic of these endeavors, and the result of an 
engineering-based approach to biological research, is to reveal the natural world as a 
reservoir of technological functions7. 
 
Function is hugely important within synthetic biology. Practitioners within the field 
routinely speak of ‘harnessing natural functions’ or ‘developing novel functions’ 
(McDaniel & Weiss 2005). Existing biological capacities are modified in order to render 
desired outcomes, or foreign capacities are transferred via recombinatorial techniques 
into target organisms much to the same end. In either circumstance, genetic material is 
altered in order to develop a desired technological function. For instance, a particular 
metabolic pathway may be transformed in order to produce a chemical the organism 
would not normally assemble on its own. Such a process would make of the cell a 
microscopic assembly mechanism. Alternatively, genetic material may be taken from an 
organism and transferred into another in an attempt to supplement the latter with new 
capacities. In this way, practitioners can develop naturally-inexistent but technically-
desirable combinations of biological processes. 
 
Additionally, the use of engineering precepts within synthetic biology favors a reduction 
of living things to functional characterizations. The desire to ‘discover’ and develop 
biological modularity is based upon a confidence that organisms can be divided into 
functionally-discrete components. This is evident in practitioners’ emphasis on units of 
genetic material, rather than the encompassing organism. The latter is often abstracted 
away, or portrayed as fully reducible to the activity of its genes. Not only are organisms 
then rendered as collections of modules that ‘do’ different things, but they are also 
revealed as potential sources of functions useful for the making of biological technologies. 
If nature is modular, and biological capacities can be transferred for the sake of human 
utility, then the natural world is a stock of potentially-exploitable functions. This stance is 
sufficiently pervasive that one prominent synthetic biologist speaks of developing a 
registry of biological functions to catalogue and manage these capacities. 
 
Heidegger argues that Ge-stell renders the world as objectless uniformity in the guise of a 
stock of usable resource. The standing reserve of function does precisely this for living 
things. In reducing biological organisms to the capacities of their biological processes, 
the distinguishing features and unique being of varying life forms are suppressed in favor 
of a totalizing homogeneity. Tellingly, a speaker at the recent Fifth International Meeting 
on Synthetic Biology argued that a defining characteristic of the field is that it does not 
see or care about boundaries between species (Voigt 2011). It is not concerned with 
differences, he stated. Rather, it looks out onto the natural world and pays attention only 
to what it can use. There do not exist living things; rather, there exist functions, which are 
transferable without limitations. This form of enframing is not mentioned by Heidegger, 
but its ramifications are fundamentally similar, in that the natural world is revealed as 
something to be used. The modality of Ge-stell proposed here enables a more robust and 
faithful ontological account of synthetic biology. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Note that my focus here is technological function, rather than biological function. In 
other work, I explore the connection between these concepts within synthetic biology. 
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6. Final considerations 
 
A number of considerations merit attention intriguing consequences of my analysis. 
These issues are critical in developing an understanding of synthetic biology—both with 
the aid as well as independent of a Heideggerian reading—and consequently deserve 
dedicated arguments outside the scope of the present discussion. 
 
The first consideration is that of calculability without precision. Synthetic biology’s 
commitment to a systematic engineering-based approach in part rests on practices of 
measurement and quantification. However, continuing attempts to effect such 
quantification have met a number of difficulties, including technical limitations, practical 
difficulties, the character of the target objects, and a field of practitioners increasingly 
wary of claims to calculability. Many researchers in synthetic biology now believe that 
their brand of quantification must allow for much broader tolerances than are generally 
accepted in other natural sciences or established engineering disciplines. Strictly speaking, 
then, not calculability without precision, but rather calculability with liberal precision. 
This view is by no means dominant, nor does it necessarily represent an acceptance of 
biological uniqueness; rather, it seems to be an acknowledgement of the current state of 
knowledge and technical capacities. Nonetheless, such acquiescence is representative of 
broader difficulties synthetic biology has encountered in studying, modeling, and 
constructing biological systems. It also indicates a pressing will to quantification that 
may suffer setbacks while remaining fundamentally undeterred. Last, it suggests that this 
engineering field has yet to consolidate its design parameters and performance 
standards—a key step in the development of novel engineering knowledge and practice 
(see Vincenti 1990) 
 
The second consideration relates to the revealing of nature as both standing reserve and 
instrumentum. Synthetic biology reveals a standing reserve of function. However, 
synthetic biology presents an interesting case insofar as the things of the natural world are 
rendered both as stock for human utility and as technological contrivances. In 
Heidegger’s examples, the instrumentum is always of human fabrication. The dam and 
power station are human-built objects imposed upon the river, which is subsequently 
revealed as a source of energy for human consumption. The contrivances of synthetic 
biology are produced from the same organisms rendered as a standing reserve of function. 
Thus, it is crucial to keep in mind that the products of synthetic biology—synthetic 
biological artifacts—are of the same initial character as the reservoir of function their 
design, construction, and use reveal. Synthetic biological work ultimately does 
distinguish between tools and resources, but these cannot be divorced as easily as can be 
the human-built hydroelectric system and the river into which it is built. 
 
Last, the standing reserve of function I posit suggests a direction for future philosophical 
work on synthetic biology. Given the nature of synthetic biology’s target substrate, the 
philosophy of technology would be well advised to enter into dialogue with the 
philosophy of biology. By bringing ‘function’ to the fore, my argument suggests one 
potentially useful link between these fields. ‘Function’ is a key concept for both the 
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philosophies of technology and biology. Navigating the multiple accounts of the concept 
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